Can California\u27s Resale Milk Pricing Law Survive the Supermarket? by Steck, Sara C
McGeorge Law Review
Volume 5 | Issue 2 Article 7
7-1-1974
Can California's Resale Milk Pricing Law Survive
the Supermarket?
Sara C. Steck
University of the Pacific; McGeorge School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals and Law Reviews at Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in McGeorge Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact mgibney@pacific.edu.
Recommended Citation
Sara C. Steck, Can California's Resale Milk Pricing Law Survive the Supermarket?, 5 McGeorge L. Rev. 624 (1974).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/mlr/vol5/iss2/7
Can California's Resale Milk Pricing
Law Survive The Supermarket?
It would be an understatement to say that maintenance of an
adequate and continuous milk supply at reasonable prices is in
the interest of almost all California consumers. Until recently,
price stability in the distribution of fluid milk was achieved by
the Director of the Department of Food and Agriculture under
guidelines prescribed by the Milk Stabilization Act. However, a
recent Los Angeles County Superior Court decision has posed a
challenge to the effectiveness of the Act by approving a joint venture
arrangement which, in effect, allows member stores to reduce their
wholesale fluid milk price below the state-established minimum.
This in turn has opened the door to other arrangements which
can circumvent the Act's minimum price standards. This com-
ment is an analysis of the growth of integration in the milk indus-
try, the joint venture arrangement, and the effect of new develop-
ments in milk distribution which threaten the continued existence
of the minimum wholesale and minimum retail pricing provisions
of the Milk Stabilization Act.
For the past thirty-seven years the California Milk Stabilization Act
has furnished the basis for public regulation of minimum prices in the
turbulent and highly competitive fluid milk industry.' Reflecting the
constantly changing economics of the industry, the Act, together with
the complementary Dairy Products Unfair Practices Act, 2 has, some-
what uniquely, been the subject of legislative attention at every regular
session of the California Legislature since 1937.8 Although supported
by this remarkable record of statutory endurance, the Act now faces
its greatest test of survival-a test produced by the continuing growth
and development of supermarket distribution of food, including milk
1. CAL. FOOD & AGmc. CODE §61801 et seq., as amended, CAL. STATS. 1937,
c. 3, at 42, c. 57, at 151, c. 413, at 1372, c. 710, at 1989. For excellent summaries
of the chaotic conditions of instability in the California dairy industry in the 1930's
prior to the enactment of the Milk Stabilization Act, see J. TINLEY, PU3LIC REGULA-
TION OF MILK MARKETIN IN CALIFORNIA (1938); Kuhrt, The Story of California's
Milk Stabilization Laws, From Chaos to Stability in the California Milk Industry, 54
CAL. DEP'T OF AGRIC. BULL. 176 (1965); see also text accompanying notes 18-22 infra.
2. CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE §61301 et seq.
3. No attempt is made here to detail the scores of amendments attempted and
accomplished through all the legislative sessions since 1937.
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and milk products,4 coupled with a recent court decision which found
an imaginative new distribution scheme to be legal under the Act.5
Since its inception, the effectiveness of the Milk Stabilization Act
and the authority of the Director of the California Department of Food
and Agriculture to establish minimum wholesale and minimum retail
prices under the Act have been continually challenged by various mar-
keting arrangements which have developed within the milk industry
as the demand for supermarket food distribution has grown. These
arrangements have principally involved a combination between milk
processors and retail outlets designed to afford those involved a greater
profit margin over that available where fluid milk is sold by conven-
tional distributors and stores at state-established minimum wholesale
and minimum retail prices.
One such arrangement, single-ownership integration, as exemplified
by Safeway Stores and Ralphs Grocery Company,6 has been in exis-
tence since the enactment of the Milk Stabilization Act 7 and is recog-
nized in the Act by a specific exemption from minimum wholesale
price regulation.8 Under this type of integration, the retail outlet owns
its own processing plant. Due to the exemption from minimum whole-
sale pricing and the substantial cost savings which such an operation
realizes, the store is able to receive its fluid milk at a cost below the
state-established minimum wholesale price which normally governs
sales between processors and stores.9 Few stores, however, are large
enough to own and operate their own milk processing plant; thus wide-
spread usage of single-ownership integration has been limited.' °
In contrast to single-ownership integration, another type of integra-
tion, which is based on multi-store ownership of a processing plant
and is exemplified by Jerseymaid and Golden Creme," was also de-
veloped early in the history of the Act. Although it appears that
multi-store integration avoided application of certain pricing provisions
of the Act, it involved substantial investment risks and exhibited little
4. See text accompanying notes 56-64 infra.
5. Knudsen v. Christensen, No. 980 923 (Sup. Ct., L.A. Co., Sept. 25, 1973).
6. Record, vol. 1, at 17, Knudsen v. Christensen, No. 980 923 (Sup. Ct., L.A.
Co., Sept. 25, 1973) [hereinafter cited as Record].
7. CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CoDE §61812, enacted, CAL. STATS. 1937, c. 413, at
1372; see also Public Hearings Relative to Minimum Wholesale and Minimum Retail
Price Orders for Fluid Milk Currently in Effect in All Milk Marketing Areas of Cal-
ifornia Before the California Dep't of Food and Agriculture, Bureau of Milk Stabiliza-
tion, Aug. 29-31, 1973, at 70 [hereinafter cited as August Minimum Resale Price Hear-
ings].
8. CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CoDE §61812.
9. Id.
10. See Exhibit 29, Knudsen v. Christensen, No. 980 923 (Sup. Ct., L.A. Co.,
Sept. 25, 1973) [hereinafter cited as Exhibit] (introduced into evidence on July 17,
1973).
11. Record, vol. 11, at 1235.
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in the way of new development after the mid-1950's when the Act was
amended to provide for quantity discounts in wholesale sales of fluid
milk.12
Because of the self-limiting aspects of single-ownership and multi-
store integration and because of various legislative amendments to
the Act, a measure of stability has been maintained in the industry.18
Recently, however, the most significant threat to the continued effective-
ness of the Act has arisen by way of a joint venture arrangement. Under
this scheme, stores whose volume requirement qualifies them for joint
venture participation purchase milk from a processing plant which is
owned jointly by themselves and the processor. Ownership dividends
are later paid by the jointly owned processor to the stores based upon
the measure of their purchases. This effectively reduces the prices paid
by the stores for fluid milk below the state-established minimums. 14 Un-
like those types of integration in which stores risk a substantial invest-
ment on their processing expertise and label, the joint venture requires
a much smaller capital investment and sales volume on the part of the
participating stores with very little risk attending such participation
since an established processor furnishes both the expertise and the
publicly accepted label to make the venture a success."i Despite efforts
by the Director to enjoin this operation, the legality of the joint venture
has now been judicially confirmed.' 6
This recent development raises the question of whether or not the
Act, m its present or an amended form, can be effectively implemented
to achieve its primary purpose-the maintenance of stability in the
dairy industry through public regulation of minimum wholesale and
minimum retail prices for fluid milk. Due to the legality of the joint
venture arrangement, as well as the possibility of other ingenious mar-
keting schemes coming into existence,' 7 the Director is now faced with
the problem of whether he can establish in the public interest a mini-
mum wholesale and a minimum retail price which will insure an ade-
quate supply of fluid milk to all of the consuming public through both
integrated and nonintegrated retail outlets, without creating unreason-
able profits for those processors and retail stores tied together by some
type of integration arrangement. Depending on how well the Direc-
12. Id. at 1251; CAL. FOOD & AGRic. CODE §62482 (quantity discount provision).
13. See text accompanying notes 74-81 infra; Record, vol. 11, at 1250-51.
14. Presentation by the Director, California Department of Food and Agriculture,
at 2 [hereinafter cited as California Milk Marketing Presentation], delivered at, Hear-
ings on California Milk Marketing Program Before the California Senate and Assembly
Interim Committees on Agriculture, Nov. 8, 1973, San Diego, Calif.
15. Record, vol. 11, at 1236-37; California Milk Marketing Presentation at 2.
16. Knudsen v. Christensen, No. 980 923 (Sup. Ct., L.A. Co., Sept. 25, 1973).
17. See text accompanying notes 124-28 infra.
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tor can solve this problem, it appears that both the dairy industry and
consumers must consider whether there is in fact a continuing need
for such regulation to prevent the return of those economic conditions
which first necessitated price control and, if so, what changes should
be made to insure the Act's effective application. This comment will
examine and seek resolutions to these problems which are important
to both the dairy industry and the general public.
PUBLIC REGULATION OF RESALE MILK PRICING IN CALIFORNIA
A. Origins
Recognizing milk to be a vital human food and an essential item
of diet, California joined other states in the 1930's in enacting legisla-
tion' 8 providing for minimum price regulation of fluid milk in order
to curb chaotic economic conditions in the industry 9 and to assure
the public of an adequate supply of milk. 20 The problems of the in-
dustry stemmed partly from the general business depression, partly
from the perishable character and the dietary importance of milk, and
partly from the shift from home delivery to store distribution as Cal-
ifornia became increasingly urbanized.2 ' Resulting price wars threat-
ened the existence of many producers and distributors in the dairy
industry, in turn jeopardizing the overall supply of milk to the consum-
ing public. 22
In 1937, the California Legislature responded to an industry beset
by unfair trade practices and characteristics which inherently caused
"disorderly marketing and price instability, ' 23 by adding the Milk Sta-
bilization Act to what is now the California Food and Agricultural
Code.24 Under the Act, the Director of the California Department
of Food and Agriculture is required to establish minimum prices for
fluid milk sold by producers to distributors, by distributors to other
distributors and to retail stores, and by distributors and retail stores
to consumers. 25 As delineated in its provisions,2 6 the purposes of the
Act include safeguarding the public interest by insuring an adequate
18. CAL. FOOD & AGoic. CODE §61801 et seq. (formerly, CAL. AGRIc. CODE
§736.10 et seq.); Kuhrt, supra note 1.
19. J. TINLEY, supra note 1, at 29-31; Kuhrt, supra note 1, at 177-79.
20. CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE §§61872, 61877.
21. J. TINLEY, supra note 1, at 2-5, 26-27; Kuhrt, supra note 1, at 176-77.
22. J. TI-LEY, supra note 1, at 9; Kuhrt, supra note 1, at 178-79.
23. Testimony of L. A. Maes, Executive Director of Dairy Institute of California,
August Minimum Resale Price Hearings at 67.
24. CAL. FOOD & AGRIc. CODE §61801 et seq. (formerly, CAL. AGRic. CODE §
736.10 et seq.).
25. CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE §§61811, 61812, 61819, 62212, 62471, 62472,
62474, 62486.
26. CAL. FOOD & AGRic. CODE §§61871-61878.
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and continuous supply of the highest quality product at fair and reason-
able prices, and achieving a stable industry through prevention of mo-
nopoly and preservation of "orderly marketing!' and "reasonable pros-
perity. 1 7  This latter objective is realized through the establishment
of minimum wholesale prices which provide reimbursement for
reasonable handling costs and return on investment to milk processors
who supply their products in varying quantities to all kinds of pur-
chasers,2" and the similar establishment of minimum retail prices to
apply to all retail stores, regardless of size.29  The purposes of the
Act are reiterated in the following judicial warning:
[P]roducers and distributors must be prohibited from selling their
milk at a lower price than that at which the entire consumer de-
mand can be supplied at no more than a reasonable profit. With-
out such restriction, when one sells milk at amounts less than that
at which some or many of his competitors can profitably do busi-
ness, in an effort to meet the reduced prices they will be forced
out of business, leaving the public with an inadequate supply of
milk.
3 0
As to the constitutionality of such provisions, California court deci-
sions, relying initially upon the 1934 decision of the United States Su-
preme Court in Nebbia v. New York,8 1 have sustained public regula-
tion of the milk industry as a valid exercise of the state police
power.32 These decisions hold that such regulations, when not used to
interfere with interstate commercee 3 and when not resulting in a denial
of due process or equal protection, are valid when the regulations are
designed to promote the public welfare and are reasonably adapted to
that purpose.34
B. Operation of the Milk Stabilization Act and Related Provisions
The basic theory behind the Milk Stabilization Act is that the Direc-
tor of Food and Agriculture shall establish minimum prices for fluid
milk at such levels as will insure an adequate and continuous supply
of fluid milk to consumers without requiring the latter to pay more
27. Record, vol. 11, at 1249.
28. CAL. FOOD & AGRic. CODE §§61877, 62487.
29. CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE §§62479(g), 62487.
30. Challenge Cream & Butter Ass'n v. Parker, 23 Cal. 2d 137, 141-42, 142 P.2d
737, 739 (1943).
31. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
32. Ray v. Parker, 15 Cal. 2d 275, 101 P.2d 665 (1940); Jersey Maid Milk Prod-
ucts Co. v. Brock, 13 Cal. 2d 620, 91 P.2d 577 (1939). See also State Board v. Thrift-
D-Lux Cleaners, 40 Cal. 2d 436, 442-43, 447, 254 P.2d 29, 32-33, 35 (1953).
33. Baldwin v. Selig, 294 U.S. 511 (1935).
34. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934); Ray v. Parker, 15 Cal. 2d 275,
101 P.2d 665 (1940); Jersey Maid Milk Products Co. v. Brock, 13 Cal. 2d 620, 91
P.2d 577 (1939). See J. TOBEY, STATE CONTROL OF MILK PRICES 12-13, 22-23 (1955).
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than is necessary to maintain such supply. 5 The focus of this com-
ment will be upon the minimum resale prices, which include both
minimum wholesale and minimum retail prices, as contrasted with the
minimum prices paid by distributors to producers for raw milk.
Under the Act the Director does not establish minimum wholesale
and minimum retail prices for all milk or milk products. The regula-
tions imposed by the Milk Stabilization Act principally pertain to "fluid
milk" which must meet the requirements for market milk, that is, milk
suitable for human consumption in a fluid state,3 6 as distinguished from
manufacturing milk which may not be sold for such consumption in
a fluid state.3 7 In addition, the Director's authority with respect to
such prices presently extends to fluid low fat milk, fluid nonfat milk,
flavored milk, flavored low fat milk, and flavored nonfat milk.38
Other "milk products," together with market and manufacturing
milk, are also regulated by the Dairy Products Unfair Practices Act. 9
This legislation prohibits specific unfair practices in the market-
ing of milk and milk products, 40 and provides for mandatory public
price filing by distributors of the prices at which they are selling milk
and specified milk products.4' Certain manufactured milk products,
while not regulated under the Milk Stabilization Act, are subject to
the price-filing provisions of the Unfair Practices Act.42  The Unfair
Practices Act and the Milk Stabilization Act, "complementary and sup-
plemental" enactments, are to be liberally construed together to ac-
complish their legislative purposes.
Minimum wholesale and minimum retail prices43 are set by the Di-
rector primarily by reference to a cost standard. This means that the
prices must be no more than reasonably sufficient to cover costs, as
defined in the Act, for each of the several methods of distribution
and to insure a reasonable return on necessary capital investment.44
In establishing these resale prices, the Director takes into account the
raw product cost, defined by the Act as the minimum price to be paid
by distributors to producers for raw milk.43  This latter price is also
established by the Director.
35. CAL. FOOD & AGRiC. CODE §§61872(b), 61877, 62479(e)(g), 62487.
36. CAL. FOOD & AGRiC. CODE §§35781-35784, 61808.
37. CAL. FooD & AGRIc. CODE §36302.
38. CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE §62472.
39. CAL. FOOD & AGic. CODE §61301 et seq.
40. CAL. FOOD & AGRic. CODE §§61374-61375 (gifts to secure business), §61382
(price discrimination among customers), §61384 (sales below cost).
41. CAL. FOOD & Aoic. CODE §§61411-61415.
42. CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE §§61411, 62472.
43. CAL. FOOD & AGRic. CODE §61342.
44. CAL. FOOD & AGRic. CODE §§62479, 62487.
45. CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE §62479(d).
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However, to accomplish the stability purposes of the Act and upon
making the required findings, the Director may, in the exercise of his
discretion, establish minimum wholesale and minimum retail prices
higher or lower than those sufficient to cover costs and reasonable re-
turn on capital investment.46  These stability findings require a deter-
mination that such minimum prices will maintain "reasonably effi-
cient stores and distributors" in business to insure an adequate supply
of fluid milk to consumers without requiring them to pay more than
is necessary to maintain such supply, and a determination that such
minimum prices will not induce unfair trade practices or monopoly in
the marketing of fluid milk.17 This alternative pricing authority of
the ,Director was further expanded in 1972 by legislative amendment
to Section 62487.48
In contrast to minimum producer prices established under stabiliza-
tion and marketing plans, minimum resale prices are established under
minimum price schedules or orders.49 All minimum prices, however,
are established in a series of marketing areasY° Such prices may vary
between marketing areas or between zones in such areas; however,
it is mandatory that the Director establish minimum wholesale and
minimum retail prices in marketing areas where he has set minimum
producer prices under stabilization and marketing plans.'
Finally, the Director establishes minimum resale prices in a variety
of categories. These include: sales by distributors to other distribu-
tors;52 sales by distributors and subdistributors to retail stores, the
typical transaction to which minimum wholesale prices apply; 3 sales
by distributors to consumers;5 4 and sales by retail stores to consumers. 5
46. CAL. FOOD & AGRic. CODE §62487.
47. CAL. FOOD & Aoauc. CODE §62487(a), (b).
48. The so-called "Marler Bill," S.B. 526, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 147, at 189, is
commented upon in more detail in the text accompanying notes 76-78 infra. The pur-
pose of the legislation is to afford the Director greater authority in establishing quan-
tity discounts from minimum wholesale prices, especially at levels of larger volume pur-
chases.
49. CAL. FOOD & AGRc. CODE §§61818, 62486, 62487.
50. CAL. FOOD & AOiuc. CODE §§61810, 62081 et seq., 62473 (zones in market.
ing areas).
51. CAL. FOOD & Aciuc. CODE §62472. The section was amended in 1973 for
the purpose of preserving the validity of minimum producer prices where the Director
fails or refuses to establish minimum resale prices or suspends or terminates such
prices. CAL. STATS. 1973, c. 839. S.B. 2111, introduced on April 16, 1974, at the
1973-74 Session of the California Legislature to amend Section 62491 of the California
Food and Agricultural Code may have the effect of further separating minimum pro-
ducer prices from minimum wholesale and minimum retail prices.
52. CAL. FOOD & AGRiC. CODE §§61806, 61806.5, 61812, 62474, 62474.5.
53. CAL. FooD & Aonsc. CODE §§61817, 62481 (restaurants).
54. CAL. FOOD & AGRic. CODE §§61811, 62479(e), 62487.
55. CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE §§61811, 62472, 62486.
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VERTICAL INTEGRATION: ITS IMPACT ON STORE DISTRIBUTION OF
MILK AND THE RESALE PRICING PROGRAM
At one time home delivery of fluid milk predominated in California.
However, beginning as early as the 1920's, store sales of milk increas-
ingly reflected the major channel for milk distribution,56 and since that
time home delivery has steadily declined. As recently as 1955 home
delivery represented thirty-six percent of consumer purchases, but by
1972 had dwindled to only seven percent. 57
With increasing store sales came the practice of integration of proc-
essing facility and store. The term "integration" recently came under
judicial scrutiny in a Los Angeles County Superior Court proceeding,
Knudsen v. Christensen.5" Although this case and the impact it has
had on the dairy industry and consumers will be discussed subse-
quently, it is important to note that the trial provided some of the
most recent data and definitions concerning integration. During the
trial, Dr. Charles E. French, then head of the Department of Agri-
cultural Economics at Purdue University, defined integration as "the
control of different decision-making units by either explicit ownership
or at least joint management." 59 In applying this concept to the milk
industry, the court, in its memorandum opinion of July 26, 1973, de-
fined an "integrated retailer" as "an entity which owns and operates
all or substantially all of the various processes through which fluid milk
and sometimes milk by-products pass from the producer . . . to the
ultimate consumer .... "I'
Integration of processing distributors and retail store outlets has
been dealt with to some extent since the inception of the Milk Sta-
bilization Act. Specifically, single ownership integration, where fluid
milk is sold by a distributor to stores owned by the distributor as exem-
plified by Safeway Stores,61 was recognized through a provision ex-
empting such an arrangement from wholesale pricing controls. 62 It
can be concluded, in light of this provision and the fact that integration
in the entire field of food distribution has increased nationally parallel-
ing the growth and development of supermarkets,6 that the trend
56. J. TINLEY, supra note 1, at 26-29.
57. CALioRNrA CROP AND LVEOCK REPORTING SERvicE, MANIJFACTURum DAIRY
PRODUCTS, MaXK PRODUCTION, UTILIZAT1ON AND PRicEs 51 (1972).
58. No. 980 923 (Sup. Ct., L.A. Co., Sept. 25, 1973).
59. Record, vol. 6, at 668.
60. Knudsen v. Christensen, No. 980 923 (Sup. Ct., L.A. Co., July 25, 1973)
(memorandum opinion at 3) [hereinafter cited as Memorandum Opinion].
61. Id.; Record, vol. 11, at 1228.
62. CAL. FOOD & AGRic. CODE §61812.
63. Record, vol. 6, at 668, vol. 11, at 1230 (testimony of Mr. L. A. Maes, Execu-
tive Director of Dairy Institute of California); Exhibits 1-2, 1-6, 1-8 (introduced into
evidence on June 25, 1973); Exhibit 24 (introduced into evidence on July 16, 1973).
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toward integration in California is not necessarily a product of the Milk
Stabilization Act.6 4  The tied-house restrictions of California's Alco-
holic Beverage Control Act,65 prohibiting ownership of retailers by
wholesalers and vice versa, have never been included in the Milk Sta-
bilization Act, nor is the idea currently contemplated because such a radi-
cal change would not now be politically feasible or reasonable.66
Testimony in Knudsen identified four basic types of integration in
the distribution of fluid milk: (1) acquisition by a retail store of its
own processing plant; (2) acquisition of stores by a processor; (3)
multi-store integration, or acquisition by several retail stores of a com-
monly owned processing plant; and (4) joint ownership of a processing
facility by an established processor and retail stores, the type of in-
tegration involved in Knudsen.67
Cost savings become important in an industry where minimum
prices are established at levels which reflect reasonably necessary costs
of "sufficient, efficient distribution '6 and "reasonably efficient retail
stores, ' 69 as distinguished from the single most efficient distributor or
store, or integrated distributors and stores as a group. The typical inte-
grated fluid milk operation in California can achieve a lower cost in
distributing fluid milk through a variety of means not available to its
nonintegrated or conventional counterpart. Since the state-established
minimum wholesale price must reflect the cost of distribution gener-
ally, it will in most instances be higher than the costs of integrated
distribution alone. This results in the integrated store having a com-
petitive advantage since its acquisition costs are lower than the state-
established minimum wholesale price and since all stores must sell
fluid milk to consumers at the same minimum retail price.70
The means through which the integrated operation is able to effect
costs savings include: confining deliveries to stores which are part of
the integration; scheduling such deliveries for maximum efficiency; de-
livering in volume; restricting the actual processing operation to the
most widely accepted container sizes; purchasing the remainder of re-
quired dairy products in packaged form from other distributors at sub-
64. Record, vol. 11, at 1250.
65. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §25500 et seq.
66. Interview with L. A. Maes, Executive Director of Dairy Institute of California,
Sacramento, Calif., Dec. 4, 1973.
67. Record, vol. 11, at 1226-28, 1231-32, 1234-37.
68. CAL. FOOD & AGtUC. CODE §62479(e).
69. CAL. FOOD & Aciuc. CODE §62479(g).
70. Memorandum Opinion at 4-8. Dr. French testified that, from a cost stand-
point, the nonintegrated grocer is at a competitive disadvantage with the integrated gro-
cer whether or not fluid milk prices are publicly regulated, but that in his opinion a
publicly established retail price and a publicly established wholesale price tend to en-
courage integration. Record, vol. 6, at 674-77.
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distributor prices; and reducing or eliminating selling expense.71 For
the same volume and conditions of delivery, the conventional distrib-
utor can approximate the integrated distributor's fluid milk costs, but
he is economically obligated to process milk for all types of wholesale
customers, such as schools, hospitals, public agencies, large and small
stores, and homes, and not merely those retail stores purchasing in
large volume.72 The cost difference between integrated operation de-
livery and conventional delivery has been estimated at anywhere be-
tween two and nine cents per half gallon of fluid milk.71
Recognizing the economic problems created by integration in a reg-
ulated industry (i.e., the inability of smaller, yet necessary, noninte-
grated operations to compete with larger integrated operations, which
in turn threatens industry stability), the California Legislature, the Di-
rector, and the dairy industry have taken various steps over the years
either to amend the Milk Stabilization Act or to administratively construe
it in an effort to equalize competition between integrated stores and stores
purchasing from conventional distributors.
The first such step was the enactment in 1955 of California Food
and Agricultural Code Section 62482, 7 authorizing the Director, in
establishing minimum wholesale prices, to provide for quantity dis-
counts. Further, in 1961, by administrative construction of the quan-
tity discount code provisions, the Director commenced incorporating
into minimum resale price orders provisions for an additional quantity
discount for limited or express service. Under this concept some
of the delivery functions normally performed by the distributor are
transferred to the retail store so that in effect the distributor accom-
plishes dock delivery of fluid milk to the store platform, and the store
then becomes responsible for all in-store handling functions.
Finally, in 1972 the California Legislature enacted the Marler Bill,
amending California Food and Agricultural Code Section 62487 to
permit the Director, in the exercise of his alternative price fixing au-
thority, to establish "particular quantity discounts" at a level higher
or lower than costs and return on investment of distributors as an
average group.7 6  The enactment is intended to permit a conventional
distributor to serve large volume purchasers at a quantity discount un-
der circumstances where such service is not below the costs of the
71. Record, vol. 1, at 58-59, vol. 11, at 1245-47, 1299, 1307-10, vol. 12, at
1404-05.
72. Record, vol. 11, at 1247.
73. Record, vol. 1, at 59.
74. A.B. 2335, CAL. STATS. 1955, c. 1310, at 2378.
75. Record, vol. 11, at 1261-63.
76. CAL. FooD & AGiUC. CODE §62487; see note 48 supra.
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particular distributor, although it might be below the costs of other
distributors not situated for service in such large volumes. 77 This
would enable "distributors in the dairy industry to compete effectively
for the business of large volume buyers who would otherwise tend
to establish their own private processing plant. '78
The described legislative enactments and administrative actions of
the Director did not halt single-store integration 7 where the store be-
came large enough to support such an operation; however, until the
Knudsen joint venture concept was introduced, multi-store integration
had slowed to the point that the most recent such organization occurred
in 1957.80 The legislation was also successful in stabilizing integration
without "disruption to the fifty percent of the industry not involved
in supermarket sales," ' thus preserving the economic purposes of the
Milk Stabilization Act as well as safeguarding the public interest by
maintaining an adequate supply of milk at fair and reasonable prices
to the entire public.
THE EFFECT OF THE JOINT VENTURE CONCEPT ON THE MILK
STABILIZATION ACT
Joint venture first emerged in 1967 when Knudsen, a prominent
conventional distributor in the Los Angeles area, under urging on the
part of its larger volume retail store customers,82 established a second
processing plant in the name of a subsidiary, Todds Food Company.
Knudsen offered a select group of its wholesale customers the oppor-
tunity to purchase stock in Todds, which then became jointly owned
by Knudsen and these preferred wholesale customers. Profits realized
by the joint venture were paid to the shareholders through ownership
dividends which were proportionate to the amount of milk and dairy
products purchased.8 3 Such dividend payments have the effect of re-
ducing the price paid for fluid milk by stores participating in the joint
venture below the state-established minimums 4 However, the initial
processor's wholesale customers whose volume is not sufficient to meet
77. Record, vol. 11, at 1263-64, 1285, vol. 12, at 1228.
78. Letter from Senator Fred W. Marler, Jr. to C. B. Christensen, Director of
the California Department of Food and Agriculture, June 9, 1972, reprinted in, Dairy
Institute of California, Legislative Bulletin, No. 6, June 15, 1972.
79. Record, vol. 1, at 17, 23, 26, vol. 12, at 1228.
80. Record, vol. 12, at 1235-36; see also Exhibit 29 (introduced into evidence on
July 17, 1973).
81. Testimony of L. A. Maes, August Minimum Resale Price Hearings at 73.
82. Record, vol. 7, at 766-67.
83. The characteristics of the Knudsen-Todds joint venture are succinctly summar-
ized in the presentation prepared by Mr. Jed A. Adams before the Senate and Assembly
Agriculture Committees at their interim hearing in San Diego. California Milk Mar-
keting Presentation at 2.
84. Id.
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the requirements for participation in the joint venture must continue
to purchase from the initial processor at established minimum whole-
sale prices without the benefit of later reduction through dividend pay-
ments.85
After considerable study of the joint venture, the office of the Direc-
tor in late 1968 issued a letter approving the Knudsen-Todds arrange-
ment.80 However, as the joint venture developed in the manner out-
lined above, the Director soon thereafter issued a "cease and desist"
letter to Knudsen asserting that Todds, in contravention of the Direc-
tor's policy and that of the Act, was unlawfully returning dividends
to its store owners in proportion to their purchases from Todds.5 7  In
the fall of 1969 the Dairy Institute of California, a non-profit trade
association of milk distributors, filed a verified complaint with the Di-
rector s" seeking an administrative determination of the legality of the
joint venture.89 Following a lengthy hearing on the complaint, the
administrative hearing officer issued his decision finding the joint venture
illegal:
Todds constitutes a device or mechanism by which Knudsen as
a processor-distributor continues to do business with a selected
group of retailers and offers to those retailers the opportunity to
purchase fluid milk and other dairy products at a price less than
the established or posted prices for items sold.90
The Director adopted this decision on May 23, 1970.91 Knudsen
then instituted litigation seeking a declaration that the joint venture
plan violated no provision of the Milk Stabilization Act. By cross-
complaint the Director sought both an injunction and civil penalties
claiming that the Knudsen-Todds operation violated the Act.92  An
initial trial of the action in 1971 resulted in a judgment in favor of
the Director. However, the court of appeals, in an unpublished opin-
ion, reversed the trial court judgment principally on the ground that
the judgment had been reached without a full trial on the merits.93
The trial court had held that because Knudsen struck from its com-
plaint allegations seeking a review of the administrative decision, such
85. Record, vol. 3, at 336, vol. 4, at 477, vol. 5, at 571.
86. Exhibit L-7 (introduced into evidence on June 26, 1973).
87. Exhibit L-8 (introduced into evidence on June 26, 1973).
88. Exhibit 3 (introduced into evidence on June 26, 1973) (Director's first
amended cross-complaint filed under the provisions of CAL. FOOD & AGRic. CoDa §
61471 et seq.).
89. Record, vol. 11, at 1267.
90. In re Complaint Against Todds Food Company, No. OLA 22,161 (Mar. 10,
1970).
91. Exhibit 14 (introduced into evidence on July 6, 1973).
92. No. 980 923 (Sup. Ct., L.A. Co., July 10, 1970).
93. Knudsen v. Fielder, 2d Civ. 39779 (Cal. App. 2d dist., Nov. 30, 1972).
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decision had become final leaving no question before the court except
enforcement. 4
The case was then returned for a full trial before Judge Charles A.
Loring of the Los Angeles County Superior Court. On July 26, 1973,
Judge Loring issued his memorandum opinion directing judgment to
be entered in favor of Knudsen.95 Due to a stipulation between
Knudsen and the Director, no appeal was taken from the trial court
judgment and the form of judgment as stipulated had no supporting
findings of fact or conclusions of law."' Thus many important ques-
tions of law raised in the proceeding were not given appellate court
review. These questions included the determination of: (1) whether
unlawful price discrimination exists between purchasers who buy from
Knudsen but who pay the state-established minimum wholesale price
without later reduction, and purchasers of Knudsen-labeled products
from Todds whose minimum wholesale price payments are subject to
later reduction through stock dividends; (2) whether assistance by
Knudsen to Todds was for the purpose of acquiring or restoring the
fluid milk business of the Knudsen wholesale customers who became
shareholders of Todds and purchasers of Knudsen-labeled products
through Todds; (3) whether the Director has the authority to prohibit,
in multi-store integration, payment of dividends by the processing en-
tity to the store owners in proportion to purchases of fluid milk and
other dairy products by such store owners from the processing entity;
and (4) whether any restraint of trade exists in the form of agree-
ments between Knudsen, Todds, and store owners of Todds that such
stores will purchase Knudsen-labeled products to the total or partial
exclusion of competing dairy products.
The judge commented that no "mere price regulation [could] com-
pletely eliminate the inequality which is necessarily inherent between
[integrated and nonintegrated operations]," and that the Knudsen-
Todds concept was a permissible means by which formerly conven-
tional distributors could deal with the problem and meet competition. 7
In addition, one of the most sweeping conclusions of the memorandum
opinion concerned the issue of pricing between a processor owned
by several stores and the store owners. Prior to the trial court deci-
sion, the Director had taken the position that in multi-store integrated
94. Id. at 6-8, 11.
95. Memorandum Opinion.
96. The judgment entered in the action was filed on September 25, 1973, in Los
Angeles County Judgments Book 6860, at 301. It is briefly and narrowly stated and,
in substance, adjudges that the Knudsen-Todds arrangement "is lawfully organized and
structured and is lawfully operating as a licensed fluid milk distributor," and that Todds
may distribute its profits to its members and adjust ownership among its members based
upon a measure of purchases described as "Modified Delivery Units."
97. Memorandum Opinion at 16, 20.
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arrangements, regardless of later dividends, initial purchases of fluid
milk by the retail stores from the processor-distributor in which they
had an ownership interest must be made at state-established minimum
wholesale pricesY8 Todds in fact charged such prices to its mem-
bers.99 The Director had also taken the position that dividends could
not be returned by such a distributor to its store owners in proportion
to their purchases of fluid milk.100 It was Knudsen's contention at
the trial that Jerseymaid and Golden Creme, two multi-store integrated
operations, had returned dividends in proportion to purchases but
that the Director had not instituted enforcement proceedings to halt
the practice. 10 1 The Director replied that such enforcement proceedings
awaited the outcome of the Knudsen litigation.10 2
The memorandum opinion appears to remove the authority of the
Director on both points stated above, so that (1) a multi-store owned dis-
tributor may return dividends to its store owners based upon their volume
of purchases of fluid milk from the distributor, and (2) in respect to
transactions between them, the multi-store owned distributor and its store
owners are removed from any minimum wholesale pricing controls under
the Milk Stabilization Act in the same manner as are single-entity inte-
grated retailers. 10 3  Although the dairy industry concern over such
reasoning parallels the concern of the Director,' in view of the stipula-
tion of the Director that judgment could 'be entered in the Knudsen
action without supporting findings, the question arises whether and to
what extent the memorandum opinion is now superseded by the judgment
on such matters as the application of the minimum wholesale price to
initial sales between a multi-store owned processor and the store owners.
Under the Act, the Director is the public agent authorized by the
legislature to determine reasonable profits for distributors and retail
stores since it is his duty to establish minimum prices to cover costs
and reasonable return on capital investment.'0 5 In the joint venture
98. Record, vol. 8, at 894-95, vol. 12, at 1444-45, 1482.
99. Record, vol. 4, at 466-68, 477.
100. Exhibit L-1 (introduced into evidence on June 26, 1973); Record, vol. 7, at
851, vol. 10, at 1196-97, vol. 12, at 1456.
101. Brief for Plaintiff at 37, Knudsen v. Christensen, No. 980 923 (Sup. Ct., L.A.
Co., Sept. 25, 1973).
102. Brief for Dairy Institute of California as Amicus Curiae at 34, Knudsen v.
Christensen, No. 980 923 (Sup. Ct., L.A. Co., Sept. 25, 1973).
103. Memorandum Opinion at 15-19. The reasoning behind the exemption of
single-entity integration from wholesale price controls as set forth in Section 61812 of
the California Food and Agricultural Code is based on the premise that when an inte-
grated operator, such as Safeway, transfers fluid milk from its processing plant to its
stores, there is no "sale" since the operator is dealing with himself. Record, vol. 8,
at 894-95. However, where more than one store owns a processor, there are two dif-
ferent entities involved so that there would appear to be a "sale" between the two en-
tities which the Director can regulate. Record, vol. 12, at 1482, 1487-88.
104. August Minimum Resale Price Hearings at 79.
105. CAL. FOOD & AGluc. CODE §62487.
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concept, as it is organized and implemented by Knudsen and a select
group of its wholesale customers, Knudsen and such customers de-
termine between themselves the division of profits from distribution
of Knudsen-labeled fluid milk and other dairy products. Upon or-
ganization of the joint venture these customers, originally paying
Knudsen state-established minimum wholesale prices for fluid milk,
simply ceased all such purchases directly from Knudsen and trans-
ferred their purchases of Knudsen-labeled products to the jointly
owned distributor, Todds, with the result that the minimum wholesale
price which they paid Todds for such products became subject to later
reduction through stock dividends. 10 6
Under these circumstances the questions may fairly be asked where
the line is to be drawn in the matter of joint arrangements between
distributors and their store customers for division of profits, and
whether the Milk Stabilization Act can survive such private industry
determinations of profit division between distributors and retail stores.
As a result of the judgment in Knudsen, devoid of findings of fact
and removed by stipulation from appellate court review, it appears that
the future of the minimum resale pricing controls under the Milk Stab-
ilization Act has been left in a state of considerable doubt. In re-
sponse to this situation, the Director of Food and Agriculture first sum-
marized the impact of the trial court judgment on the administration
of the Act as follows:
Joint ventures . . . result in expansion of the total market ser-
viced by integrated firms and increase the amount of fluid milk
that is not subject to the minimum wholesale prices established
under the legislative standards of the Act. Under our tentative
interpretation of the court judgment . . a retail store must be-
come a member of a joint venture to obtain this lower price and
the joint venture must have a processing plant different from the
distributor's regular plant to qualify . .. . If the savings from
large deliveries are to be passed on to the consumer through a
lower minimum retail price, the smaller stores will have to charge
more than the minimum out-of-store price to retain their margin.
The opportunity to purchase below the established minimum
wholesale price provides a tremendous incentive for large grocery
stores to join joint venture operations. The regulated wholesale
price acts as the umbrella and the higher the established wholesale
price relative to raw product cost, the greater the incentive.107
106. Record, vol. 3, at 336, 342, vol. 4, at 477, vol. 5, at 571, vol. 7, at 766.
107. California Milk Marketing Presentation at 3; see also Record, vol. 11, at
1260.
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Without, as yet, any legislative curbs on joint ventures and with the
increased incentive to join such operations, the competitive ability of
the conventional distributor, serving all facets of the public with a full
line of milk products, may well be in jeopardy. This, in turn, places
a greater strain on the public availability of an adequate supply of milk
in all places at fair and reasonable prices.
THE FUTURE OF THE RESALE PRICING PORTIONS OF THE ILK
STABILIZATION ACT
A. Initial Response to and Suggestions Resulting from the Decision in
Knudsen v. Christensen
After the issuance of the memorandum opinion in Knudsen v.
Christensen, attention of the dairy industry and consumers focused on
three areas: whether interested parties desired retention of the Milk
Stabilization Act; whether action might be taken within the framework
of present law; and whether legislative changes were needed to cope
with the problems which the joint venture has created.
1. Retention of the Act
In order to examine the question concerning retention of the Act
in general, the Director of Food and Agriculture shortly after the deci-
sion in Knudsen held a three-day public hearing in Sacramento.105
Due to the responses drawn from well represented consumer groups,"0 9
members of the dairy industry, and retail store groups, the California
Department of Food and Agriculture subsequently declared that "[ais
a result of this hearing the Director concluded the program does serve
the public interest and announced the department's policy to maintain
the Milk Stabilization program."' 10
2. Action Under Present Law
As the Milk Stabilization Act authorizes the Director, after public
hearing, to suspend on a temporary basis all or particular minimum
wholesale and minimum retail prices in a marketing area or zone
within such area,"' the Director, in response to an industry petition,
108. August Minimum Resale Price Hearings.
109. Consumer groups represented at the hearing included the Consumers Coopera-
tive of Berkeley, California Food Action Campaign, San Francisco Consumer Action,
and Consumer Federation of California.
110. California Milk Marketing Presentation at 4.
111. CAL. FOOD & AGlic. CODE §62491. No doubt as a result of the problems
outlined in this comment, S.B. 2111 was introduced at the 1973-74 Session of the Cali-
fornia Legislature on April 16, 1974, for the purpose of amending Section 62491 to ex-
tend the Director's authority under that section, presently encompassing the suspension
of resale prices only, to include termination of such prices as well.
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scheduled a public hearing in one of the largest marketing areas in
the state-the North Central Valley Marketing Area which includes
Sacramento County. Following the hearing and under the authority
granted to him by the Act, the Director ordered: "Minimum subdis-
tributor and minimum wholesale prices for fluid milk and fluid low fat
milk sold in one gallon, half gallon, and quart containers . . . shall
be suspended until further notice."" 2  Research discloses no prior utili-
zation by the Director of his authority to suspend minimum prices,
although the supporting statute has been in effect since 1961.113 In
the Sacramento area, the wholesale price suspension temporarily sta-
bilized the market. As required by the Act, the extension of minimum
wholesale price suspension was considered at a public hearing on Feb-
ruary 5, 1974.11"
It should be noted, of course, that the potential freedom of a mini-
mum wholesale price suspension is limited because (1) the minimum
out-of-store price must still be maintained, (2) the requirement of
price-filing remains, and (3) the prices filed should be reasonable if
distributors desire restoration of state-established prices. As a result,
in the Sacramento area, where there has been a suspension of minimum
wholesale prices, most distributors have followed the price leader in the
area in filing their minimum wholesale prices."'
Simultaneously with the consideration of temporary suspension of
selected minimum wholesale prices, the Director also conducted a
series of public hearings in various marketing areas"0' for the purpose
of giving consideration to the deepening of wholesale discounts pur-
suant to Section 62487 of the California Food and Agricultural Code,
as amended by the Marler Bill."17
3. Possible Amendment of the Act
Along with these two approaches to the integration problem under
present law which emerged immediately from the Knudsen litigation and
from the public hearings before the Director, there was also considera-
112. North Central Valley Order No. 45, Nov. 9, 1973.
113. .CAL. FooD & AnGIC. CODE §62491, as enacted, CAL. STATS. 1961, c. 2195, at
4540.
114. Cal. Dep't of Food and Agriculture, Notice of Public Hearing, issued Sacra-
mento, Calif., Jan. 18, 1974.
115. Interview with Jed A. Adams, Milk Marketing Administrator for the Cal-
ifornia Department of Food and Agriculture, Sacramento, Calif., Dec. 7, 1973.
116. See Cal. Dep't of Food and Agriculture, Notice of Public Hearing, issued Sac-
ramento, Calif., Nov. 15, 1973, in which three separate hearings for the Central Valley,
Tulare-Kings, and Kern County Marketing Areas were noticed.
117. See text accompanying notes 76-78 supra.
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tion given to legislative amendment of the Milk Stabilization Act to make
it more responsive to the current permissible trends in the marketing of
fluid milk. In the Director's presentation to the Senate and Assembly
Agriculture Committees in San Diego on November 8, 1973, four such
amendments were suggested.' Two of the suggested amendments ap-
pear to be nonsubstantive. The first is amendment of Section 62482
of the California Food and Agricultural Code to permit service charges
applicable to minimum wholesale prices. According to the Director's
statement, this amendment would permit the Director to "establish the
minimum wholesale price in the large volume deliveries with increases
to cover the additional costs of servicing progressively smaller volume
deliveries."" 9 The second suggestion is for the addition of a new
provision to the Code to provide discounts for prompt payments.
Present regulations permit a distributor to extend credit to a wholesale
customer for sixty days.12 0
The remaining two legislative suggestions are substantive and go
to the basic price-fixing standards of the Act. The first of these is
amendment of the Act to enable the Director to establish minimum
wholesale prices based upon the costs of only the most efficient distrib-
utors rather than the costs of "sufficient, efficient distribution" as at
present.' 21 A serious constitutional question would seem to be present if
the price-fixing standard -were to result in the establishment of minimum
prices which cover the costs of only the most efficient operator in the
market, or the so-called "true minimum," notwithstanding the inability
of the single operator to supply all the needs of the market. Dr.
French testified that if minimum prices were set at only the level of
the most efficient operator, he did not "believe that [that] would re-
sult in effecting the intent of most of the control programs that [he
knew] of because that [would] not bring forth an adequate supply." 22
The second substantive suggestion concerns amendment of Section
62479(g) of -the California Food and Agricultural Code to permit the
Director to establish out-of-store minimum retail prices based upon the
costs of only the most efficient retail stores, again the true minimum,
rather than the costs of "all reasonably efficient retail stores" as at
present. 23  Such an amendment would appear to favor the large vol-
118. California Milk Marketing Presentation at 6.
119. Id.
120. CAL. ADmiN. CODE tit. 3, §1883.
121. For the present statutory standard of "sufficient, efficient distribution" see
CAL. FOOD & AGRiC. CODE §62479(e).
122. Record, vol. 6, at 715.
123. CAL. FooD & AGRic. CODE §§62479(g), 62487.
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ume stores, again potentially endangering the adequacy of supply to
consumers.
There has been criticism of these suggestions which were made
at a time when there was little certainty as to what effect the legality
of the joint venture would have on the dairy industry and on the Direc-
tor's ability to effectively establish minimum resale prices. Due to
current activity in the industry, it is now questionable whether such
suggestions are still being considered as viable legislative alternatives
to the present programs as set forth in the Milk Stabilization Act.
B. Recent Responses and Problems-The Future of the Act
Since the holding in Knudsen v. Christensen, it has become increas-
ingly apparent that the future of the Act will be affected by more
than the specific joint venture as presented in Knudsen. Although
the joint venture increases profits to its grocer participants, it also ap-
pears wasteful and uneconomical in that a processor separates his proc-
essing facilities into two plants, one geared for the benefit of joint
venture participants, the other left to diminishing efficiency because
of the removal of the joint venture volume from the processing plant. 1'2 4
1. Alternative Arrangements
The continued effectiveness of the Aot will depend upon the Direc-
tor's ability to enforce minimum wholesale prices in a market where
various types of integration arrangements are under study for purposes
of competing with the joint venture. Many arrangements may be con-
ceived of to compete with the joint venture if the industry generally
engages in programs for integrating conventional distributors and their
store customers. For example, a conventional distributor might lease
his processing plant to a group of retail store customers under a lease
arrangement which could be canceled without great financial penalty
to the grocers if they so elected. Under the lease the store group
could process fluid milk utilizing, for a fee, the processing expertise
and the label of the conventional distributor. Once licensed as a dis-
tributor, the store group could then, under the reasoning of the memoran-
dum opinion in Knudsen, make processed fluid milk available, free
from minimum wholesale price controls, to the members of the group,
whether as stockholders in a corporation or partners in a partnership.
Even if such controls were applicable, their effect would be diluted
by dividend returns on purchases by the members of the group from
124. California Milk Marketing Presentation at 3; Record, vol. 11, at 1319, vol.
12, at 1258-60, 1320, 1359, 1371-72, 1380.
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the licensed processing entity which such members had organized.
The store group could also admit the conventional distributor to owner-
ship in the lessee processing entity, so that the latter would be in a
position to supply both the stores and the conventional distributor with
fluid milk. In this situation there would be, as to fluid milk, a joint
venture confined to one processing plant.
Also to be considered is the possibility that cooperative associations
of grocers organized under the provisions of the California Corporations
Codel25 might become processing distributors. Section 12805 pre-
scribes patronage dividends to cooperative members "based in amount
upon the volume of business transacted with the corporation by such
patrons." Previously, the Director of Food and Agriculture was able
to prevent store owners from receiving dividends proportionate to the
volume of fluid milk they purchased from the processing organization.
As this policy was in direct conflict with the provisions of the California
Corporations Code relating to cooperative corporations, grocer coop-
eratives have not become fluid milk processors. Under the reasoning
of Knudsen, however, the Director may no longer proscribe such divi-
dend returns.126  Grocer cooperatives may now think more seriously
about forming their own processing plants. If they do, the question
arises whether all grocer members of the cooperative will have effec-
tively removed themselves from the controls established by the Direc-
tor in the form of minimum wholesale prices applicable to retail stores
generally.
The potential of these new competitive forms of integration pre-
sents the Director with the problem of determining whether there may
be a joint venture without two separate processing plants. However
he handles this situation, his enforcement powers will be suspect be-
cause of the result in Knudsen. The scope of his authority is even
more questionable because of his decision not -to seek appellate review
of the troublesome legal issues presented in Knudsen and because
there have been no appellate decisions dealing with these issues. Can
the Director reasonably expect that any integration designed to com-
pete with the joint venture will be invalidated by a trial court in light
of the reasoning expressed in the memorandum opinion of Judge Lor-
ing?
2. Usage of Director's Licensing Power
Still another source of conflict is the Director's power to issue licen-
ses to distributors. Any new integration of distributors and stores will
125. CAL. CoRp. CODE §12200 et seq.
126. See text accompanying note 103 supra.
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require a distributor's license for the newly integrated entity. The
Director has the authority to deny such a license if he is not satisfied
with the "character, responsibility and good faith" of the applicant.127
As competition for grocer trade through integration intensifies, it is
likely that grocers will be offered participation without much financial
risk on their part. Where will the Director draw the line in approving
such arrangements? And what chance of success can he expect in
the courts if he denies such a license application, and the applicant
seeks judicial review? 128
3. Permissive Establishment of Minimum Prices
As the impact of joint venture and competing integration arrange-
ments on the Milk Stabilization Act has become more severe, proposals
for legislative amendments of the Act now include terminating its pro-
visions as to minimum wholesale pricing or making enforcement of
such provisions permissive rather than mandatory. The latter sugges-
tion would afford the Director authority to remove minimum wholesale
pricing in a marketing area for an indefinite period as contrasted with
his present price suspension authority which can be exercised only on
a temporary basis. This would inhibit stores and distributors from
waiting until a temporary suspension is lifted to institute their new
organizations or combinations.
4. Minimum Retail Price
Joint ventures and other similar arrangements where the store cus-
tomers of a processing distributor secure a larger profit margin than
they could by purchasing at state-established minimum wholesale prices
obviously place a great deal of pressure on the retail price, mainten-
ance of which is a key feature in integration. 29  The public hearing
held on February 5, 1974, reflected this strain. One purpose of the
hearing was to determine whether minimum retail prices of gallon,
half gallon, and quart containers of fluid milk and fluid low fat milk
should be "suspended or reduced in the event that the Director finds
that suspension of minimum wholesale prices [should] be continued." 1 0
The notice of the meeting stated that "[m]arketing activities and con-
ditions at the wholesale level indicate that minimum retail price levels
127. CAL. FOOD & AGRic. CODE §61975.
128. See CAL. Gov'T CODE §11523; CAL. CODE Civ. PROC. §1094.5.
129. See text accompanying notes 70-73 supra (greater store margins being derived
from savings on the wholesale level and sale at the state-established minimum retail
price).
130. Cal. Dep't of Food and Agriculture, Notice of Public Hearing, issued Sacra-
mento, Calif., Jan. 18, 1974.
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may result in unwarranted margins at some levels of purchase."' 31  Of
all actions instituted by the Director and the industry since the Knudsen
trial, the discussion and the potential of suspending minimum retail
prices may well be the most significant. As noted, the minimum retail
price is a key feature in integration, for it is through the maintenance of
such prices that single ownership integration can realize greater profits
through its exemption from minimum wholesale prices and increased
plant efficiencies over those realized by a conventional distributor. The
minimum retail price also furthers the profit-sharing features of joint
venture. However, it should be noted that a minimum retail price is
considered a key stability factor, 32 and the success or failure of the
market in maintaining stability during any suspension of the m imum
retail price may finally determine whether the Act has outlived its useful-
ness. Alternatively, the Director may well decide that where such mini-
mum retail prices are not suspended along with the minimum wholesale
price, the public interest will not be served in a substantially integrated
market unless the increased store margins resulting from integration are
reflected in a reduction of state-established minimum retail prices.
5. Repeal of Minimum Resale Pricing
Past legislative proposals indicate that the Milk Stabilization Act,
in all of its phases, is vulnerable to total or partial repeal. 1 3  Even
after the joint venture concept was first approved in Knudsen, most
distributors, as evidenced by early hearings, continued to support the
Act despite the threat of economic instability.13 4 The hearings further
indicated that consumers were of the opinion that -although price
regulations were not completely desirable, the price and the supply
of milk that the regulations helped to maintain were definitely in the
public interest.' 35 As an alternative to total repeal of the resale pricing
provisions of the Act, consideration could be given to legislation pre-
serving, in the Director, authority to establish from time to time, on a
temporary basis only, minimum wholesale prices and/or -minimum retail
131. Id.
132. Interview with L. A. Maes, Executive Director of Dairy Institute of Califor-
nia, Sacramento, Calif., Dec. 4, 1973.
133. E.g., A.B. 2417, 1973-74 Regular Session (to repeal the consumer pricing pro-
visions of the Act); A.B. 1831, 1970 Regular Session (to repeal the minimum whole-
sale pricing provisions of the Act); A.B. 1848, 1969 Regular Session (to repeal the
minimum wholesale pricing provisions of the Act); S.B. 705, 1969 Regular Session(to make all resale pricing permissive); S.B. 1010, 1968 Regular Sesstion (to exempt
certain subdistributor pricing from control); A.B. 2256, 1967 Regular Session (to repeal
the resale pricing provisions); A.B. 1918, 1967 Regular Session (to repeal the resale
pricing provisions); S.B. 971, 1967 Regular Session (to make all resale pricing permis-
sive rather than mandatory).
134. See text accompanying notes 109-110 supra.
135. August Minimum Resale Price Hearings at 153.
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prices in a marketing area threatened by severe market instability. How-
ever, in light of the potential for new joint ventures and competing ar-
rangements, and the present consideration by the Director of suspension
or reduction of the minimum retail price, repeal of either or both of the
minimum wholesale and minimum retail pricing provisions of the Milk
Stabilization Act may become increasingly likely.
CONCLUSION
The importance of milk as a dietary requirement and the production
of milk to meet consumer demand have by no means diminished since
the 1930's when the need for regulation of the milk industry to insure
an adequate supply of quality milk to the public at reasonable prices
first became acute. In the food products industry, by far the largest
major industry in the United States in dollar value of end products
distributed,'8 6 dairy products rank second to meat and represent the
seventh largest single industry nationally.137  Among the states, Cal-
ifornia is the second largest distributor of dairy products and the largest
seller of fluid milk13 8
In light of these statistics illustrating that the dairy industry is not
only large but also powerful, it would appear that the need for regulation
has not diminished. Although circumstances have changed since the
1930's, the reasons behind the enactment of price regulations of fluid
milk have, if anything, increased.
It must also be noted that California's Milk Stabilization Act has
served the consuming public well, as California's pricing regulations are
among the most sophisticated in the country and have insured that
consumers within the state pay one of the lowest prices for fluid milk
in the nation. 3 In the past, the California Legislature and the Director
and his staff have amended the regulatory program and have changed
administrative practices under the program so that the Act has accom-
plished useful purposes. 40
136. 2 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMRCE, CENSUS OF MANUFACTURES 28 (1967), supple-
mented by, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MANUFACTURES FOR 1971
at 3.
137. 2 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CENSUS OF MANUFACTURES, code 20, at 3-5(1967); U.S. DEP'T OF COMMeRCE, 1972 CENSUS OF MANUFACTURES (ADVANCE Rn-
PORT).
138. 2 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CENSUS OF MANUFACTURES, code 20, at 5, code
20B, at 9 (1967).
139. For a summary of past departmental studies of this point see, Testimony of
L. A. Maes, August Minimum Resale Price Hearings at 68-79; see also Statement of
L. A. Maes, Hearings on California Milk Marketing Program Before the California
Senate and Assembly Interim Committees on Agriculture, Nov. 8, 1973, San Diego,
Calif.
140. Indicative of these efforts to make the Milk Stabilization Act as responsive
as possible to current trends, Senate Resolution 98 was introduced on April 15, 1974,
at the 1973-74 Session of the California Legislature. On adoption of this resolution,
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However, the conclusion is inescapable that the present economics
of the industry, accentuated by integration and legal construction of
the joint venture, confront the resale pricing provisions of the Act with
their greatest challenge for survival to date. Since its inception, the
Act has been premised upon the establishment of minimum prices
which are cost related. Ultimately, it would seem that no system of
minimum prices devised by the Director could be justified from a pub-
liec benefit standpoint unless it was founded upon costs. As noted in
the introduction of this comment, the problem confronting the Direc-
tor, in the interests of stability and maintenance of an adequate public
milk supply, is to arrive at a system of minimum prices which will
be adequate for representative distributors and retail stores notwith-
standing what seem to be increasingly wide variations between the
costs of individual distributors and stores.
In evaluating the possibility of total repeal of the resale pricing provi-
sions of the Milk Stabilization Act, it is hoped that restructure, rather
than repeal, will be considered by the legislature and that in any
event a strong unfair practices act will be retained. Although it
would seem that arrangements such as joint venture would starve,
rather than thrive, without the Milk Stabilization Act and that unfair
competitive practices would continue to be controlled by the present Un-
fair Practices Act, repeal of the resale pricing provisions of the Milk
Stabilization Act would end the security of supply, price, and quality of
fluid milk that public regulation has achieved for consumers as well as
members of the dairy industry for thirty-seven years.
Sara C. Steck
the Senate will undertake an in-depth review of the fluid milk stabilization and mar-
keting provisions as a result of the joint venture's emergence as a "viable entity" and
substantial changes in business practices which have led to "unforeseen relationships
between processing distributors and retail outlets."
